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In writing about the production 
of cinema’s felt bodily illusions for 
moving through space, Scott C. 
Richmond sets himself the task of 
describing what cinema does to 
modulate human perception, how 
we attune to cinema, and how 
 cinema operates above and below 
the representational level, that is, 
at the infrastructural and circuitous 
sensate levels that bodies plug into 
during a film encounter. The orga-
nizing investigation is into “the set 
of perceptual processes whereby we 
orient ourselves in and coordinate 
ourselves with the world” named 
proprioception, on which a selection 
of films “thematize and roughen 
our perceptual and, thus, embod-
ied involvement with the world 
unfolding before us onscreen” (6). 
Richmond seizes on the paradoxi-
cal doubled body in proprioception 
that involves the self in the world 
and one’s reflexive  self- perception 
of that self. Polemically then, 
Richmond seeks to invigorate 
a “true phenomenology of per-
ception” (69) for cinema studies 
that refocuses its attention on the 
viewer’s thickened, resonant, and 
voluptuous experience of films by 
rehabilitating the concept of pro-
prioception via James J. Gibson, 
Renaud Barbaras, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty in conjunction with 
aesthetics refashioned by Steven 
Shaviro after Kant and Whitehead 
(plus a late reading of Walter 
Benjamin) to account for what 
happens in the “technicity of the 
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assume cinema is a system for rep-
resenting objects that fool the spec-
tator into believing they actually 
appear. Richmond insists that on 
the nonrepresentational level, one’s 
proprioceptive grasp of movement 
abides even when one knows they 
are not actually moving. Attending 
to the illusion of flying sidelines 
the problem of correspondence 
onscreen and off that entangles 
debates on film’s photographic real-
ism, also in comparison with digital 
technologies. Instead bodily illu-
sions of proprioceptive movement 
index “the always palpable diver-
gence between ordinary perception 
and its technical modulation by the 
 cinema” (70). I was convinced that 
the overriding cinematic illusion 
is the proprioceptive fun of being 
“compelled, even captivated, by 
the cinema’s aberrant information” 
that I accept (however provision-
ally) due to what Merleau-Ponty 
describes as the perceptual faith that 
conditions my inherence in this 
world, which is given to the world 
onscreen and off (89).
The “I” that foregrounds his 
spectatorial position leads the 
reader into thick description of 
select scenes and illusory effects in 
Marcel Duchamp’s Anémic Cinéma 
(1926), Tony Conrad’s The Flicker 
(1965), Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: 
A Space Odyssey (1968), Godfrey 
Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982), and 
Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity (2013) 
that together amass a range of peri-
ods, genres, and technical supports. 
flesh” (a combination of Bernard 
Stiegler and Mark Hanson) 
 during the coupling of viewer and 
 cinematic technics. In this regard 
the book is a startling composi-
tion of theoretical frameworks 
from psychology, media theory, 
and  continental philosophy that 
enriches every field it engages but 
most of all seems concerned with 
advancing the philosophical pur-
chase of cinema for rethinking 
bodily being as partial, processual, 
relational.
I enjoyed the challenge of read-
ing with Richmond across highly 
technical idioms to finesse new 
understandings of “the illusion of 
bodily movement through onscreen 
space, or cinematic kinesthesis” 
(18) by developing the central con-
cepts of “proprioceptive aesthet-
ics” (chapters 1 and 5), “ecolog ical 
phenomenology” (chapter 3), the 
Epochē and the Écart (chapters 2 
and 4), and “cinema as technics” 
(chapter 6). But, for me, it was 
Richmond’s tackling of the simple 
idea that cinema presents an illusion 
to its audience that accomplished 
the difficult work of overturning 
hegemonic perspectives in film 
studies that adhere to philosophical 
skepticism and modernist debates 
on medium specificity. Typically 
scholars are concerned with the 
“illusion of reality” or the illusion 
of moving images (58). “Illusions 
that feel like illusions are not decep-
tive,” he writes (58). This is against 
the field’s skeptical bias that would 
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that cinema undercuts the notion 
of bodily autonomy.
This is to say, the book stridently 
takes on any overt or covert alle-
giance to an individual’s autonomy 
in relation to technology, language, 
and the world of representation/
art. The burden of the controlled, 
separate individual who must com-
municate via “critical athleticism” 
crops up in dominant frameworks 
for aesthetics especially within 
modernism. This kind of film critic 
couches a skeptical subject who 
properly differentiates an object 
from its appearance and their body 
from the world at large. In bolster-
ing this posture, Richmond might 
have expanded on feminist, trans-
gender, and queer theory insights 
and interventions within phenom-
enological body studies that our 
bodies are not ours alone, nor are 
we only our bodies (cf. Liz Grosz, 
Jay Prosser, Judith Butler). The 
problem of asserting bodily auton-
omy is—let me just say it—a prob-
lem of White European Colonizing 
Man as Human, a sickly hangover 
from Enlightenment thinking with 
which Richmond himself quar-
rels. Indeed, the problem of bodily 
autonomy is the lack thereof not 
just for some subjects but for all 
subjected to the false ideal therein.
Taking another tack, Cinema’s 
Bodily Illusions quietly announces 
a fun cinema whose tickling, sen-
sitizing technicity in the flesh 
teases the unbounded viewer—a 
far cry from Baudry’s unitary and 
The chapters that center on these 
filmic examples each offer an elab-
oration of what is at stake in the 
deconstruction of dualist concepts 
for embodiment such as the visible 
and invisible with flesh, and of 
the bodily ambivalences between 
what’s onscreen and offscreen, real 
or hallucinatory, or the spectatorial 
position between active and pas-
sive. Hence, it struck me as some-
what odd that Richmond declines 
the explicitly feminist standpoint 
of Vivian Sobchack in The Address 
of the Eye (1992) or the postcolo-
nial critique of Laura U. Marks 
in The Skin of the Film (1999). He 
announces in the introduction that 
“the phenomenological remit of 
this book is to bracket its repre-
sentational dimension—and thus 
also to suspend most of our ways 
of attending to the social, politi-
cal, cultural, and ideological work 
of the cinema,” which necessarily 
involves “foregoing politics” until 
the final sixth chapter in which 
Walter Benjamin’s revampment 
of media theory for the problems 
of technological modernization 
is brought into play (18). Despite 
this said bracketing, I detect an 
overarching political program that 
would be integral to feminist and 
postcolonial projects. In theoriz-
ing the more general and pervasive 
way in which cinema modulates 
a viewer’s body into experiencing 
the perceptual sensations of fly-
ing, floating, and hallucinating, 
Richmond foundationally takes it 
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underlying assumption is that we 
do so in whatever format because 
they are inexplicably fun. The 
book’s aim to explicate the work-
ings of such fun aesthetics, in my 
experience, adds to rather than 
detracts from better understand-
ing why “I delight in . . .” certain 
cinematic affects. Cinema stud-
ies would do well to attend to 
an outright laugh, a giggle, or to 
taking pleasure in a “frankly psy-
chedelic” effect or the yielding 
to the training of proprioceptive 
aesthetics. Richmond succeeds 
best in presenting dramatized and 
dedramatized scenes of cinephilia 
predicated on a non-sovereign 
body: “I am neither self-possessed 
nor self-sufficient. I am open to 
the world not only perceptually 
but also technically” (17).
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masterful viewer plugged into 
the cinematic apparatus. I mean a 
fun cinema in the many senses of 
enjoyable, foolish, silly, humorous, 
strange, odd, or causing perplexity 
(terms that Richmond uses). The 
book’s achievement of reintroduc-
ing amusement and wonder also 
goes far in countering the negative 
affects towards illusions, or even 
towards the potentially damaging 
element of cinematic technologies, 
which underlie apparatus theo-
ries and stretch back to concerns 
over stimulating optical toys and 
spellbinding phantasmagoria. In 
his realm of admittedly idiosyn-
cratic film viewing, we encounter 
this fun cinema as one of pleasure, 
especially in submission; examples 
include thin and anemic cinema 
that give rise to cute experiences, 
evanescent, and terrifying feelings, 
and other giddy, funny, and weird 
cinema that instantiates thrilling, 
panic-inducing, meditative, slip-
pery, and vertiginous moments. 
Although Richmond focuses on 
the how of cinematic coupling 
with human perceptual systems, 
rather than the why, clearly the 
